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Abstract
Contemporary systems of production, distribution, and retail provide many 
end-consumers, although certainly not all, with an unprecedentedly wide 
choice of cheap, high quality goods and services. Yet this bounty comes at ever 
higher, ultimately unsustainable environmental and social cost. Something must 
change but what and how? Simply how production, distribution and retail 
are organized? Simply patterns of consumption, that is, overconsumption on 
the part of some, who must be convinced to consume less? Or must the target 
be production, distribution, retail, and consumption in their totality, that is, 
economic life as a whole? This paper sketches a basis and general framework for 
answering these questions.
Introduction: The new economic order
As Conca 2002 points out, the contemporary economic order, which offers at 
least some an unprecedented combination of choice, quality, and price, is only 
very superficially characterized in terms of ‘globalization’—as if its bounty were 
simply the result of massively increased cross-border transactions. Whether 
in pursuit of competitive advantage or merely in response to competition, 
enterprises have used both technological innovation and political clout to create 
a web of supply chains characterized by what Princen (2005) has described as a 
logic of efficiency. This logic is an ongoing dynamic of rationalization in Weber’s 
sense which selects for processes and procedures of greater efficiency, that is, 
1  Author contact: carleton.christensen@anu.edu.au.
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processes and procedures for which the ratio of outputs to inputs is higher. As a 
result, the truly distinguishing feature of the new economic order has emerged: 
very long chains of production, distribution, and retail, often indeed spanning 
the globe, along which goods and services flow with increasing rapidity and 
with an unparalleled capacity for the rapid re-routing of these flows.
Crucially, what counts as greater efficiency at any node along a supply chain is 
ultimately determined by what counts as efficiency at the final node prior to 
consumption in the literal sense of use, namely, consumption in the economist’s 
sense of sale. Efficiency at the retail end consists in being able to offer what the 
end-consumer will regard as the best possible mix of choice, price, and quality. 
Consequently, competition will combine with technology and politics to yield 
a system of production, distribution, and retail given over to optimizing for 
efficiency in this sense, that is, for choice, price, and quality, and this dynamic 
will in turn make supply chains longer, faster flowing, and more flexible.
The emergence of an economy given over to optimizing for efficiency in the sense 
just indicated involves a redistribution of economic power. As Conca points out, 
there has been a rearrangement of “the balance of power among the economic 
agents in a [supply] chain and between those agents and the regulatory state.” 
This rearrangement renders:
regulatory and technological approaches to environmental protection much less 
effective. As a result, these traditional approaches are increasingly likely to target 
the weakest nodes in the chain rather than the strongest. (Conca, 2002, p. 144)
Note that the problem of regulatability to which Conca is alluding does not 
arise because of the international or global character of supply chains—as if 
international agreement or even world government could provide a regulatory 
or technological answer. The problem is not one of jurisdictional or regulatory 
reach. It is rather that contemporary supply chains have assumed a form which 
makes them intrinsically difficult to regulate, whatever the regulatory instance, 
whether a state regulating by passing and enforcing law or an individual 
regulating by asserting his or her will politically.2
Note further that the rearrangement of which Conca speaks involves a shift of 
economic power away from producers toward the retail end of supply chains. 
New technologies give retailers unprecedented access to a diversity of suppliers 
and the new politics and public policies give them unprecedented opportunities 
2  That the problem is not one of (absent) jurisdictional reach, of, say, an international agreement or even 
world government, is shown by the fact that problems of regulatability arise even with long, highly complex 
and shifting supply chains within national borders. This is illustrated by the case of labor supply to the 
farms providing the Australian food mega-retailers with produce—see www.abc.net.au/news/2015-05-04/
supermarkets-food-outlets-exploit-black-market-migrant-workers/6441496?WT.mc_id=Innovation_News-Fo
urCorners|LabourExploitation,SlaveLikeConditionsFoundOnFarmsSupplyingBiggestSupermarkets_FBP|abc.
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to use these technologies to play suppliers off against one another according to 
who can supply the higher quality at lower cost. Inevitably, in a competitive 
environment retailers able to exploit these opportunities will exploit them. 
In consequence, there arises a tendency to monopsony toward the retail end 
which explains the rise of the mega-retailers now found in many if not all supply 
chains. Mega-retailers, sometimes of global reach, now dominate numerous 
supply chains, for example, food, fast food, furniture, hardware, clothing, to 
some extent sportswear, and even bookselling. Many of these mega-retailers are 
retailing own brands, hence now possess product design capacity yet they do 
not actually produce these brands.3
Note finally that this redistribution of power toward the retail end is 
simultaneously an enhancement of its economic power across the supply chain. 
The capacity to play suppliers off against one another gives retailers the capacity 
to undercut their competitors in offering end-consumers higher quality at lower 
cost. Precisely for this reason the redistribution is a tendency to monopsony, as 
less-effective retailers, for example, local shop owners, fall victim to the lower 
prices offered by their competitors. Consequently, competition intensifies and 
the whole supply chain becomes explicitly organized around providing wider 
choice and higher quality at lower cost. As indicated above, it becomes rational 
in Weber’s sense, that is, explicitly given over to enhancing efficiency, the ratio 
of outputs to inputs. And the desired output is ultimately an optimal mix of 
choice, quality, and cost.
Evidently, the unregulatability of supply chains entails that achieving 
environmental sustainability and social justice requires more than mere 
regulatory and technological tinkering with the current system. A radical 
transformation is needed. In particular, supply chains must become shorter 
(Renting et al., 2003), slower, and less flexible in order to make them more 
manageable with regard to such issues as sustainability and social justice. 
But what could this mean? Some think that it means going back—going back to 
earlier forms of economic organization, in which things did not move as far, as 
quickly, and as unpredictably. We must go back to more nationally and indeed 
locally based modes of production, distribution, and retail, hence to more 
nationally and locally specific modes of consumption, as exemplified by the small 
town economy, with its purely local stores, workshops and farms, and its slower 
pace of life. This will involve less choice at lower quality and higher price for 
consumers. But the undoing of economic rationalization will bring alternative 
rewards which, once tasted, will convince everyone that the renunciation was 
3  Even information and communication technology is subject to such tendencies: Apple is arguably more 
a distributor and retailer with product design capacity than a producer.
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worth it. For these older forms of economic organization involved, or so it is 
thought, a degree of transparency, community, and solidarity now lost to us. 
Recovering this will compensate for the material sacrifice.
For two reasons such ‘localist’ or (bio-)‘regionalist’ thinking is naive. Firstly, it is 
not obviously true either that older forms of economic organization were more 
environmentally benign or that they possessed greater degrees of transparency, 
community spirit, and social solidarity. Certainly, they were often more racist 
and sexist, possibly just as ageist, and frequently small-minded. Secondly and 
more importantly, the current economically rationalized economic order arose 
out of the older forms, as individuals naively explored the possibilities of new 
technologies, perhaps in order to secure their own economic advantage, perhaps 
simply because these new technologies seemed to them to offer numerous 
undeniable gains without any serious losses. The older forms of organization 
thus lacked any institutional capacity to identify in what direction innovations 
and improvements in numerous undoubted goods—for example, in comfort, 
cleanliness, and convenience (Shove, 2003)—were taking us. Yet it is precisely 
this capacity one is calling for when, in response to contemporary problems of 
environmental destruction and social injustice, one demands a form of economic 
organization in which supply chains are shorter, slower, and stiffer, hence more 
manageable. The real problem with ‘localist’ or (bio-)‘regionalist’ thinking is thus 
that it does not answer the question posed by the inherent unmanageability of 
the new economy. Shortness, slowness, and stiffness of supply chains is merely 
a necessary, not sufficient condition for their manageability. One must therefore 
shorten, slow, and stiffen in such a way that institutional oversight is created 
and for this the bygone provides no model. ‘Localist’ or (bio-)‘regionalist’ 
thinking fails to see this.
It would, however, be equally naive simply to dismiss such thinking as entirely 
wrong-headed. The idea of the local is not an answer to the question of how 
to shorten, slow, and stiffen supply chains in a way which makes them more 
manageable but it does provide a clue to where one might look for an answer. 
The appeal to the local is in fact a muddled attempt to specify two crucial features 
of an answer: firstly, the kind of economic order required for manageability; and 
secondly, the kind of economic order which could offer such alternative rewards 
to beneficiaries of the current unmanageable order that they would be prepared 
to forgo their benefits and embrace an alternative, more manageable one.
We need, therefore, to investigate the idea of the local economy in order to 
determine what makes it so attractive as an answer to two problems: the problem 
of manageability and the problem of motivation. We may suspect that what 
makes the idea attractive is the perceived interrelation of these problems: what 
accounts for the shortness, slowness, and stiffness of highly localized supply 
chains is also inchoately perceived to be what accounts for those features of 
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them which plausibly appear to be alternative rewards consumers could enjoy 
if only they renounced their current profligate ways. So we must analyze the 
kind of economic interaction in which individuals engage when they assume 
the role of consumers, retailers, and/or producers in highly localized, small-
scale economies and bring out the difference when they assume these roles in 
the new economic order of long, fast-flowing, flexible supply chains.
Thick and thin conceptions of the economy 
and its actor
Supply chains are woven together by relations of exchange. Workers sell their 
labor time; producers sell their products; distributors, lawyers, and agents 
sell their services and skills; and finally retailers sell their wares to end-
consumers. In the older, more local forms of economy displaced by the new 
economic order the exchange relation typically, if not necessarily always, takes 
place between individuals who live and mutually know one another to live in 
the same community, hence share and mutually know one another to share a 
common background of norms and values. This common background enables 
trust and goodwill, which in turn ensures good faith, at least as a rule, in the 
conduct of exchange, so much so, indeed, that often no explicit legal regulation 
is needed. As such, each party to exchange may rationally assume that, even if 
occasionally the other party might not desire a fair exchange, as a rule this latter 
does—perhaps because he or she is concerned about the longer-term damaging 
effects, for example, to reputation, which unfair exchange might have, but often 
enough simply because he or she prefers to be fair.
Such points have often been noted. Less noted, however, is the presence within 
such localized exchange relations of what I shall call a normatively thick conception 
of rational agency. In order to get at this, let us move from the real, from actual 
socioeconomic reality, to the ideal, the classical tradition of reflection on such 
reality. For a normatively thick notion of rational agency is presupposed by the 
classical political economists Smith,4 Ricardo, and Marx5 in their accounts of 
the exchange relation. When theorizing about the nature of exchange relations, 
such thinkers typically proceed by envisaging idealized situations, often of 
simple barter, in which the parties to exchange are assumed to be acting, and to 
mutually know themselves to be acting, in good faith. In effect, these thinkers 
4  See Smith (1759/1981, II, ii, iii, p. 125). 
5  It would be a misunderstanding, both of the point made here and of Marx himself, to object to Marx’s 
inclusion here. Marx’s whole point is that capitalist exchange, particularly the exchange of labor power 
for wages, is so to speak ontologically or structurally hypocritical. In capitalist exchange, when it is ideally 
functioning, both parties seek a fair exchange yet even then, indeed precisely then, distinctively capitalist 
exploitation (extraction of surplus value) and alienation take place.
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abstract from real local exchange relations, of which, of course, in their day there 
were many more, to an idealization thereof in order to identify the concepts and 
principles operative in real exchange relations.
But why do they do this? Because they believe, or rather unreflectingly assume, 
that the relevant concepts and principles of economics and politics can only be 
identified in this way. In one way, even highway robbery is an exchange relation: 
the robber receives money, the robbed continued life. So, too, is the situation in 
which sellers compel buyers to pay too much, or buyers compel sellers to accept 
too little. Yet classical political economy rightly regards neither highway robbery 
nor extortion as the kinds of exchange by studying and reflecting on which 
one could effectively identify the mechanisms by which markets operate, that 
is, prices are determined in the economy. This is not because classical political 
economy regards no economy as possible unless as a rule parties to exchange 
acted, and mutually knew themselves to act, in good faith. A general pattern or 
practice of human behavior such as an economic system is only possible if the 
individual acts in which it is realized occur as a rule, that is, according to a rule. 
Acts of robbery are, however, by definition exceptions to a rule. Trivially, no 
economy could consist of acts of robbery. The case is, however, different with 
extortive buying and selling. An economy is conceivable in which many, possibly 
even most acts of exchange were extortive. It could display some durability 
and resilience as a system although not as much as an economy in which most 
parties to exchange acted, and mutually knew themselves to act, in good faith. 
So an economy is possible in which parties to exchange did not act, and did not 
mutually know themselves to act, in good faith.
So when classical political economists assume a concern for fairness in the 
idealized depictions of exchange from which they extract economic concepts 
and principles, they are not thinking of the economy as a system which requires 
for any kind of durability and resilience that its component acts be conducted 
as a rule in a spirit of fairness. They in fact have a deeper reason for their 
assumption. From the outset, they assume that the point of economic activity, 
hence of exchange, is not simply to service the needs and desires, whatever they 
might be, of economic actors, but rather to contribute to the existence of these 
latter as free rational agents, respected as such by others. Economic interaction 
is understood from the outset as given over to serving the legitimate needs and 
desires of economic actors for whom being fair is a value in and of itself, indeed a 
value most mostly adhere to.
In other words, the classical political economists assume from the outset that 
economic interaction possesses those general patterns of behavior which make 
it a possible object of study for them by virtue of its being essentially oriented 
not simply toward satisfying human need and desire but toward enabling 
human beings to exist most fully as the self-conscious, rational beings they 
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essentially are—as what Kant calls ends in themselves. In this sense, they 
are assuming a normatively thick concept of economic life and interaction. 
And  in assuming this, they are assuming a correspondingly thick concept of 
the human beings who participate in such life and interaction. Human beings 
are understood to be rational agents, that is, beings condemned by nature—
by their nature—to satisfy need and desire by use of reason. But for the classical 
political economists this understanding goes hand in hand with another: that 
human beings are rational agents is understood to mean that they are also moral 
agents, that is, beings who (a) understand what it is to be fair and equitable in 
one’s dealings with others and that one is morally required to be so, and (b) are 
as a rule concerned to be so, typically because one is morally required to be 
so. For classical political economists such as Marx, Ricardo, and Smith, it is 
constitutive of being a rational agent that one can understand and apply moral 
concepts in moral judgments and that as a rule—psychopaths are, of course, 
an exception—one has a sense of decency and self-respect which makes one 
capable of conscience, shame, and guilt. The idealized economic actor one must 
presuppose in order to understand economic order is someone who from the 
outset prefers to do the right thing and, at least as a rule, actually does the 
right thing.
Not by chance, then, do the idealized exchange relations described and 
elaborated particularly by Smith and Ricardo look like the kinds of exchange 
relation one finds in small-scale economies—relations one has to the butcher, 
baker, and candlestick maker. Both the idealized exchange relations of 
politically economic theory and the real ones of a highly localized, small-scale 
community, for example, a small country town, tacitly presuppose a certain 
conception of what the individual at least ideally is who enters into an exchange 
relation with another. Parties to exchange are assumed to be rational not just 
in the sense of being able to order courses of action according to the degree to 
which these courses of action are desired or preferred. They are assumed to have 
more structure than this. In particular, the desires of each party to exchange 
are assumed to be governed, and known by the other party to be governed, by 
a master desire to act fairly and equitably—provided, of course, that the other 
party can be relied upon similarly to act fairly and equitably. In short, as a self-
conscious, rational agent, any party to exchange is willing, and is understood by 
the other to be willing, to do the right thing by the other, at least as a rule if not 
always; each is willing, and is understood by the other to be willing, to temper 
private or personal interest6 by considerations of fairness—a  willingness 
grounded in respect for the other as deserving of fair treatment.
6  Private or personal interest must not be identified simply with self-interest. A private or personal interest 
need not be selfish but rather, say, an interest in the good of one’s children or even an interest in an ethical 
cause to which one is personally committed.
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Moreover, the reason why in both the idealized cases considered by classical 
political economy and real cases of local exchange this richer, indeed somewhat 
Kantian conception of self is presupposed is the same: de facto the same 
understanding of the point and purpose of exchange is operative, namely, that it 
is there to permit decent people to live decently. So in both theory and reality the 
assumption is that the defining point of exchange and of economic interaction 
generally is to enable beings prepared to give others their due to receive their 
due, hence to receive some fair degree of desire-satisfaction, that is, to have, 
as far as possible, their legitimate desires and preferences satisfied. Economic 
interaction takes place not just to ensure efficient allocation of resources, and 
thereby efficient satisfaction of desire. Rather, it takes place in order to enable 
those who participate in it to be happy without doing wrong and to do right 
without being unhappy—to live well in Aristotle’s sense.
This is a crucial result. For what conception of the rational agent is implicit in 
the kinds of exchange relation which have displaced the highly localized kind? 
Let us consider, in particular, the retail exchange relation since as we have seen 
retailing has become so powerful in the new economic order. Mega-retailers 
have replaced the friendly neighborhood grocer and hardware shop owner 
because they are more competitive with regard to choice, price, and quality. 
They are more competitive because they have greater capacity to shop around 
for suppliers who can offer them wider choice, lower cost and/or higher quality, 
which they can then pass on to their customers. Thereby they progressively 
select for retail exchange relations which are no longer embedded in and 
carried by any common community or background familiarity between buyer 
and seller. In this sense, the retail exchange relation has been rendered purely 
efficient, purely a means–ends transaction.
Evidently, this development leads to retail exchange relations which are now 
as a rule, and not just as an exception, impersonal and unfamiliar—the kind 
of retail exchange relation which late modern shoppers experience as they 
push their shopping trolleys around the mega-retail outlet. Note, however, 
that corresponding to this development is a shift in how both the rational 
agent, whether buyer or seller, and economic life and interaction in general 
are understood. In selecting for economically rationalized, more efficient 
exchange relations, economic competition also selects for new conceptions of 
the economic actor, that is, of the economically rational agent and of economic 
life and interaction in general. In one’s role as an economic actor, that is, when 
taking part in the exchange relations which hold supply chains together, in 
particular, retail exchange relations, one is acting as a rational agent if and only 
if one subjects a range of prima facie desirable actions to a cost-benefit analysis 
through which one orders them according to how efficiently they are realizable. 
In this picture, then, economic actors are not to assumed to have as a rule a master 
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desire to act, or preference for acting, fairly and equitably which constrains this 
cost-benefit analysis. Relatedly, the economy is understood to be a domain of 
interaction given over simply to satisfying need and desire effectively or, as it is 
more usually put, to allocating resources efficiently.
In short, in selecting for new, economically rationalized exchange relations, the 
logic of efficiency selects for a new conception of what it is for human beings to 
comport themselves rationally in exchange relations, hence of what the economy 
ideally accomplishes, given this economically rationalized conception of the 
economic actor. Clearly, these new conceptions correspond well to how the 
economic actor and the economy are conceived in much of the economic theory 
which has superseded classical political economy. But what is the practical and 
political significance of these points, particularly with regard to the issue of 
how supply chains might be shortened, slowed, and stiffened in way which 
addresses both the problem of manageability and the problem of motivation?
Breaking the hegemony of the economic
If the source of unsustainability is ultimately an economic system given over to 
the pursuit of efficiency for the sake of ever wider choice, ever higher quality, 
and ever lower price, then what must change is the system as a whole. It will not 
do simply to target production, distribution, and retail exchange, as if techno-
regulatory solutions involving no change in levels of consumption sufficed.7 
Nor  will it do simply to target consumption, as if exhortation about the 
imprudence and injustice of current consumption8 sufficed. Such exhortation 
would provide no guidance as to how the beneficiaries of current patterns of 
consumption could live well in a radically more sustainable and more just way 
and so, because no radically more sustainable and radically more just social 
order can be imposed upon these beneficiaries, it would be pointless. Those who 
currently benefit must be offered a genuine alternative, one which could make 
them want social transformation toward significantly greater sustainability and 
social justice because it enabled them themselves to live well, perhaps indeed better.
This imposes a strong condition of adequacy on any putative solution to the 
interconnected problems of unsustainability and social injustice. Achieving 
sustainability and social justice requires that supply chains be made more 
manageable, hence shorter, slower, and stiffer. But the considerations just 
adduced show that such shortening, slowing, and stiffening will mean less 
choice, lower quality, and higher price. In other words, it will deny consumers, 
7  As Hawken et al. (1999) believe. For all the rhetoric about a radically new approach to design, natural 
capitalism remains firmly focused on the production side alone.
8  As exemplified by Ewen (1976), Schor (1998), Hamilton and Denniss (2005), and many others.
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particularly but not exclusively in the First World, a considerable slice of the 
benefits they currently enjoy. Consequently, no such shortening, slowing, and 
stiffening will be viable in the long term unless, in addressing the problem of 
manageability, it also addresses the problem of motivation. The solution to the 
problem of manageability must therefore also plausibly constitute a solution to 
the standing problem of human existence, namely, how to live well.
But what has made supply chains so long, fast flowing, and flexible is the 
relentless dynamic of rationalization according to criteria of efficiency. So one 
part of the solution to the problem of motivation will consist in showing that and 
how this dynamic impacts negatively upon all dimensions of life. Specifically, it 
must be shown that and how it distorts the realization of what economic actors 
essentially are on the thick conception of them, namely, finitely rational agents, 
in other words, rational animals in a recognizably Aristotelian sense, essentially 
oriented toward living not just happily and not just virtuously, but both 
simultaneously—toward living well. Evidently, this is to assume that the thick 
conceptions of the economic actor, hence of the economy, are correct. But  if 
this assumption is correct; and if it can be shown that and how the hegemony 
of the economic distorts the realization of the thick conceptions, then one will 
have shown that and how an economic order subject to unceasing economic 
rationalization tends toward dissatisfaction and indeed unhappiness even for 
those who benefit materially from it.
The other part of the solution to the problem of motivation would consist in 
showing that and how the putative solution to the problem of manageability better 
realizes the regulative ideal of living well, understood as a life of contentment 
because in it justice and personal happiness are unified. Evidently, here, too, the 
assumption is operative that the thick conceptions of the economic actor, hence 
of the economy, are correct. But if they are correct, then the putative solution 
to the problem of manageability would have been shown to be a genuine, that 
is, genuinely motivating alternative to the current economic order, even for those 
who currently benefit from the latter. The problems of manageability and of 
motivation would have been, as required, simultaneously solved.
Clearly, accomplishing all this cannot be undertaken in this paper, not the least 
because it would involve validating the thick conceptions of the economic actor 
and the economy. For this reason, I will in the next section simply make some 
suggestions as to the general form a solution to the problem of manageability 
would take, intimating along the way how, under the assumption that the thick 
conceptions are correct, this solution also solves the problem of motivation. 
Then, in conclusion, I will intimate how one might make good this assumption.
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The politicization and democratization 
of supply chains
Let us consider one particular supply chain, namely, the food supply chain, 
as a case to work from. This supply chain is chosen not just because it constitutes 
a good example but because when one works with thick conceptions of the 
economic actor and the economy it turns out to be a fundamental one, that is, 
at the very core of an economy whose defining purpose is to enable finitely 
rational beings to live well. Other examples of core supply chains would be 
education, health, and housing. The basic principle governing the effort to make 
food supply chains manageable is that the end-consumer, retailer, and producer 
should become, precisely in their roles as end-consumer, retailer, and producer, 
political. More precisely, supply chains must be structured in such a way that 
individuals in them, in their roles as end-consumer, retailer or producer, can 
collectively determine, in political fashion and according to political criteria, 
e.g., criteria of sustainability and justice, how the supply chain functions. 
What would this look like in our representative case of the food supply chain?
We should start with phenomena to which environmentalists already appeal 
as presaging new practices of food production, distribution, retail, and 
consumption in the literal sense. Around the world diverse efforts are being 
made to find alternatives to the existing system of industrial agriculture, from 
farmers’ markets through community gardens to urban and labor-intensive 
agriculture which bring people back to the land. Possibilities for small-scale, 
labor-intensive food production, both in urban, suburban, and rural contexts, 
need to be explored. This would require development of arguments against 
urban consolidation, which is frequently and often disingenuously promoted 
as a strategy for sustainability. In particular, these efforts need to recognize an 
underlying, unifying goal: blurring the distinction between city and country, in 
an effort to keep people on land and land around people. To this end, strategies 
of decentralization and distribution of the population through the landscape, 
connected by rapid mass transit, would be needed.
Farmers’ markets should, of course, be promoted since they bring urban 
end-consumers into face-to-face contact with food producers. At the same 
time, it must be acknowledged that farmers’ markets are relatively superficial 
phenomena: not only are many of the products currently sold at such markets 
indistinguishable in terms of their sustainability from what one can buy in a 
conventional supermarket, the knowledge they impart of food production 
is actually minimal. Nonetheless, they could provide an important line of 
communication between end-consumers and producers on the basis of which, 
given the right support, more ambitious measures could be grounded. Thus, the 
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contact they enable could be utilized for creating arrangements of mutual 
support between rural and urban communities. This could lead to arrangements 
with urban residents and municipalities which give farmers access to urban 
green space in order either to produce themselves or to mentor urban residents 
in urban agriculture. Conversely, it could lead to arrangements where urban 
residents work part time or casually in rural production in return for produce.
But perhaps most significant would be the idea of extending aspects of the 
principle of food consumer cooperatives to standard food retail. The idea behind 
this would be to exert pressure on standard food retail from both ends of the 
supply chain, from the producers and the end-consumers. One could imagine 
representative bodies of producers and end-consumers jointly insisting, from 
opposite ends of the supply chain, on certain kinds of environmentally friendly 
and socially just retailer behaviors. Goals would not be restricted to such low 
hanging fruit as bans on plastic shopping bags, palm oil products, and excessive 
packaging. Ideally, one would seek to empower end-consumers and producers to 
work with retailers, beginning at the local level, in order to change the character 
of retail itself. For example, consumer representatives might insist that there be 
greater representation of bulk ingredients for preparation at home rather than 
highly processed dishes for the microwave, that products be sourced locally, 
and that less emphasis be placed on highly packaged individual portions.
The impacts of these changes would begin in patterns of consumption (in the 
literal sense) and ramify down the supply chain to producers. In particular, they 
would mean more retail handling and serving; even checking out would take 
longer so retailers would be less able to push customers through their stores. 
Such inefficiencies would contribute significantly to shortening, slowing, and 
stiffening supply chains. But these impacts would engender other environmental 
and social goods currently sacrificed at the altar of efficiency. For example, 
there would be a considerable reduction in the use of plastic, something which 
would itself contribute to shortening and slowing supply chains since plastic 
packaging is essential for transporting produce over long distances, for moving 
goods quickly, and for the individual portions which make self-serve possible. 
The impacts would thus extend to the very layout and look of retail outlets: less 
freezers and shelves, more counters and staff. Last but not least, these changes 
would reduce retail choice since retail choice is not simply a function of how 
many suppliers a retailer can access but also of packaging and portioning: 
without plastic packaging and individual portions it becomes harder to offer 
many brands of the same kind of product.
Of course, in order to accomplish this, there would have to be a significant 
reorientation in the understanding of commercial enterprise. The idea that 
companies exist simply in order to enhance shareholders’ value would have to 
be renounced. This would in turn require a change in the culture of investment, 
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away from the idea that investment is simply a way of using capital to generate 
more capital. Alternative forms of commercial enterprise would therefore have to 
assume a larger role, for example, producer and retailer cooperatives alongside 
the cooperatives of end-consumers already mentioned.9 Their economically 
cooperative rather than competitive goals make cooperatives more likely to 
embrace ethical constraints on capital accumulation. A development of the idea 
of a cooperative would be to extend the already familiar idea of, for example, 
food consumer cooperatives to include selected producers in a single cooperative 
body. End-consumers could thereby help producers in the distribution and 
retail of produce while producers could respond directly to consumer concerns 
about food quality and environmental and social issues generally. In addition, 
cooperatives involving urban end-consumers and rural producers would 
facilitate the extension of production into urban landscapes and, conversely, 
the engagement of urban end-consumers in production. Nor need the producers 
be strictly local; one could imagine First World consumer cooperatives linking 
up with producer cooperatives in the Third World in the name of fair trade.
Evidently, any such politicization and democratization of the food supply chain 
would require end-consumers, retailers, and producers alike to think and act 
ethically, not just prudentially, when performing their respective roles within 
the supply chain. So the implementation of strategies for a more political and 
democratic food supply chain would lead to the chain’s adapting to ‘fit’ the kind 
of economic actor which enacts it: just as the current supply chain maintains 
and is itself maintained by economic actors thinking and acting in terms of 
what most effectively and efficiently realizes their individual desires and 
preferences, so, too, a transformed, politicized and democratized supply chain 
would maintain and be itself maintained by economic actors who think and 
act in the light of a common interest in a supply chain which delivers produce 
at acceptable levels of choice, quality, and price while being constrained by 
considerations of sustainability and social justice. In short, the supply chain 
comes to implement the thick conception of the economic actor qua finitely 
rational agent.
Furthermore, if, as I am tacitly assuming, the thick conception is correct, 
then a politicized and democratized food supply chain will, given sufficient 
visceral experience of and habituation to it, appear more desirable than one 
which operates simply according to criteria of choice, quality, and price for 
the consumer. For rational agents in the thick sense have a concern to do the 
right thing which makes them able to moderate the satisfaction of their desires 
and preferences once they become aware of others to whom they harbor no 
ill will who would suffer if they pursued desire-satisfaction simply according 
9  An interesting example of this is the Earthworker Cooperative in the Latrobe Valley of Victoria, 
Australia—see http://earthworkercooperative.com.au/.
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to criteria of what desires and preferences they can effectively realize in the 
circumstances and how efficiently. This concern is all the more effective in 
moderating the satisfaction of desire and preference the more individual 
consumers are supported by and work together with other actors in the supply 
chain. For this reason, it is crucial that the alternative supply chain envisaged 
have mechanisms embedded in it which support solidarity and communication 
along it. For the capacity to create and maintain such support is an essential 
component of the capacity to provide the alternative rewards which make the 
alternative supply chain more desirable in the longer run. In other words, such 
support mechanisms are an essential part of the alternative rewards which would 
compensate for narrower choice, lower quality, and higher price, in particular, 
for more frequent unavailability, increased seasonality, and greater regionality.
Last but not least, politicization and democratization of the food supply chain 
would require that people have more time to think and act more reflectively—
even at the cost of what, by current standards, would count as inefficiency. It 
would thus be essential to break with the tendency of the current economic order 
to subordinate time to its imperatives. For most people this is experienced as the 
primacy of work: no time off from work, whether merely for rest and recreation; 
for familial, social, or political engagement; or indeed for reflective thinking 
about the point and purpose of time on is sacrosanct. If the economy requires it, 
then these activities and the socially appointed times for and durations of them 
must be renegotiated. Thus, the weekend in the sense of a socially appointed 
period during which all regular work ceases in order that there might be 
collective time off for collective non-work activity is increasingly undermined. 
Increasingly, indeed, one must be prepared to work whenever required during 
the day; other activities must be rescheduled to fit. Increasingly, too, one is 
expected to move to where the work is, even to relocate when work relocates. 
Sometimes one must be prepared to travel thousands of miles to work, hence be 
absent from one’s family, friends, and community for several weeks on end, as 
illustrated by the fly-in/fly-out workplace.
The subordination of time to economic imperatives undermines the capacity to 
act freely and think reflectively. Thus, one would prefer to use environmentally 
friendlier public transport but must choose to use the private car because one’s 
schedule is so tight and fragmented vis-à-vis the schedules of others. Moreover, 
the increasingly individualised character of work induced by its increasingly 
temporally and geographically fragmented character gives individuals less 
opportunity to reflect collectively with others, which is the process through 
which one best learns how to compare one’s own needs and desires with those 
of others, hence to moderate the former in the light of the latter. The capacity of 
individuals to gain critical distance to their needs and desires is thus impaired, 
such that it becomes harder for each to say, “I thought I really wanted that but 
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now I see that I can go without it.” In general, when temporal and geographic 
fragmentation forces individuals back upon themselves, their wants becomes 
less negotiable, so to speak less fungible, and so it becomes harder to envisage 
and accept alternatives. Lastly, it becomes harder to reflect meaningfully on 
what the nature of one’s work is and on what effects it is having on oneself and 
one’s society.
A food supply chain defined by a concern not simply to optimize for choice, 
quality, and price but also and primarily to constrain such optimization by 
considerations of sustainability and justice could not afford such truncation 
of practical reason. It therefore cannot operate at such speeds that practical 
deliberation is impeded in the ways indicated. In particular, a politicized and 
democratized food supply chain would positively require individuals to have 
time and capacity to reflect on what the effects of work and of the economy in 
general are and especially on whether, as currently organized, work and the 
economy serve the purpose of economic life adequately. Work would thus be 
regulated in its speed and flow by the requirements of such reflection rather 
than the other way around.
This is a crucial point: a politicised and democratised food supply chain would 
involve end-consumers, retailers and producers working together to determine 
the operation of the entire supply chain. The supply chain must therefore have 
the capacity to allow time off from regular work activity in order to participate 
in oversight of other nodes in the chain. Similarly, end-consumers whose regular 
work activity occurs in other supply chains would have to have time off from 
their own work activity in order to be able to participate in the regulation of 
the food supply chain. Naturally, the converse would also apply: end-consumers 
must be able to choose to participate in the regulation of (aspects of) other 
supply chains. This does not entail, of course, that everyone must be involved in 
every supply chain in which they participate, either as producer, retailer or end-
consumer; this would be absurd. But it does entail that the pace and character of 
all supply chains must be such as to permit individuals to choose to participate 
in the regulation of a given supply chain if they want to do so. The food supply 
chain and supply chains generally must have the freedom and capacity to offer 
participation at different points along them. This would require a much more 
leisurely pace for supply chains overall.
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Conclusion: A critically theoretic 
interdisciplinary research agenda
Clearly, implementing ideas such as those outlined in the previous section 
would amount to a radical transformation—all the more so when one considers 
that one cannot change the food supply chain in accordance with them without 
changing all supply chains in their totality, that is, the whole economy. All 
the greater is the need, therefore, for substantial empirical research. For 
example, it would be crucial to investigate the issue of just how much and in 
what way urban agriculture could contribute to food production in advanced 
capitalist countries. Relatedly, it would be essential to investigate whether 
and to what degree agriculture in general can and should be rendered more 
labor intensive: contemporary capital-intensive agriculture only achieves 
its great labor efficiencies on the basis of cheap energy, both for fuel and for 
fertilizer, and the current source of this, oil, is running out with no substitute 
in sight. Moreover, there are many social and political benefits to be had from 
increasing the labor intensity of the economy: provided it can be done without 
impoverishing people materially or culturally, more labor-intensive agriculture 
would revitalize regions and reverse the depopulation of city hinterlands. 
One starting point for such empirical investigation would be the literatures on 
urban agriculture,10 the “new peasantries” (van der Ploeg, 2009), and the Cuban 
experience (Premat, 2009) because these provide evidence that labor-intensive 
and small-scale urban agriculture can make a genuine economic contribution in 
some areas even if some activities, for example, grain production, must always 
require non-local or large-scale broad acre farming (see Dyball & Newell, 2015, 
pp. 194–195).
Further empirical and theoretical research would be required in order to 
investigate how other supply chains might be politicized and democratized, for 
example, furniture and hardware. Such politicization and democratization would 
potentially be far more effective than certification or even producer-responsibility 
legislation in monitoring the harvesting of timber and the materially intensive 
production of low-price but low-quality tools which rapidly end up in landfill. 
Moreover, the idea of extending principles developed for the representative case 
of the food supply chain to other supply chains provides an opportunity for 
addressing a crucial theoretical issue in radical environmental politics. As already 
intimated, it need not and indeed cannot be the case that all individuals will be 
involved in all supply chains in which they appear as either producer, retailer, 
or end-consumer. This suggests that the politicization and democratization of 
supply chains enables a kind of social engagement and solidarity which is not 
10  See, for example, www.sustainable-everyday-project.net/urbact-sustainable-food/.
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totalizing in the manner implicit in much green romanticizing about community 
and direct democracy. For it is a conception of highly local, direct democratic 
engagement which is not concerned with the affairs of the whole but merely with 
those of that aspect of the supply chain in which a citizen happens to be interested. 
The picture painted here is thus not of all citizens gathering together in order to 
decide, in direct democratic fashion, the affairs of society as a whole. As far as the 
political sphere is concerned, this can remain representatively democratic and 
therefore a domain protective of standard liberal rights, up to and including the 
right not to be involved, that is, to be a purely private citizen. The politicization 
and democratization of supply chains would be consistent with a less emphatic, 
low key kind of social solidarity and support, along the lines of what Miller 
and Woodward (2012, p. 10) call the silent community. This more modest form 
of community is arguably more practically consistent with the reality of mass 
society and more ethically consistent with modernity’s distinctive emphasis on 
individual autonomy.
There is also a necessary philosophical dimension to the theoretical research 
clearly required by the idea just sketched of politicizing and democratizing 
supply chains. For the thick conceptions of the economic actor and the economy 
presupposed by this idea require justification. At first, one might think that 
such justification is a perfectly empirical issue. Has not much recent empirical 
investigation shown or at least strongly suggested that many human beings, 
although certainly not all, have a propensity to act in a spirit of fairness if others 
act similarly; and that in general they bear goodwill to others, at least within 
certain bounded domains of familiarity? (See, e.g., Fehr & Fischbacher 2003.) 
Why, then, should any distinctively philosophical grounding of this conception 
be needed?
Empirical investigation can certainly show that many or even most human beings 
incline to fairness and goodwill, just as it can show that many or even most 
swans are white. But the thick conception of the economic actor qua rational 
agent makes a claim stronger than this. It is not simply a statistical claim to the 
effect that, as a matter of brute fact more than fifty percent of human beings 
incline to fairness and goodwill. Rather, it claims that humans do so as a rule. 
This means that although there certainly are some humans who are not thus 
inclined, these individuals are derivative upon rest—derivative in the sense 
that they are exceptions which presuppose, hence prove the rule. That is, in a 
sense which must, of course, be further specified, an individual can only exist 
as not inclined to fairness and goodwill because and insofar as there are others 
who are thus inclined. The thick conception asserts something which cannot 
be established in the empirical fashion in which one establishes that many or 
most swans are white or indeed that many or most humans incline to fairness 
and goodwill.
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But now one might ask whether the thick conception is needed at all. Perhaps 
from the strictly practical point of view of the environmental activist all one 
needs is simply the weaker general claim that many people are inclined to be fair 
and display goodwill. Is this not enough to work from in the effort to reorder the 
economic order away from its orientation simply toward providing goods and 
services as efficiently as possible? No, it is not enough; the necessity expressed 
by the claim that humans as a rule are disposed favorably toward the right and 
toward others is essential because it permits one to argue that all possible human 
beings and not just certain actual ones are as a rule oriented toward living well, 
hence not toward unconstrained desire-satisfaction. Thereby it permits one 
to argue that even those who deny the claim that human beings are as a rule 
oriented toward living well, indeed even those whose behavior contradicts it, 
are not truly happy even though they feel perfectly comfortable, have lots of 
pleasant experiences and few painful ones. Consequently, the thick conception, 
when justified, gives one confidence that in the long run anyone who is fully 
and sufficiently rational could be brought by argument or personal experience 
to acknowledge that the claim is right and that they would be happier if their 
lives, as agreeable as they currently are, could also be that much more ethical 
without (significant) loss. This points to a powerful result: precisely in order 
for it to provide a rational basis for activists to believe that beneficiaries of the 
current economic order can be rationally brought to regard, indeed to experience, 
their current life as suboptimal, the thick conception must be understood to be truly 
and irrevocably philosophical, such that it can only be justified philosophically.
Actually providing this philosophical justification would require some heavy 
duty philosophy which cannot be undertaken here. Arguably, however, it 
would take Kantian form. That is, in order to establish the crucial conceptual 
link between rational and moral agency in which the thick conception consists, 
one would seek to show that the capacity for first-person thinking presupposed 
by the concept of rational agency—the capacity to think, for example, “I am 
6 foot tall” or “I see Mount Everest”—requires a unity of the self which does 
this thinking that is only possible if this self has an understanding of who and 
what it is, an understanding which involves a grasp of itself as measuring up, to 
one degree or another, to norms and values that matter to it. It thus does not just 
have knowledge of norms and values, it cares about them, hence suffers guilt 
and shame insofar as it fails to live up to them. In particular, it possesses some 
degree of self-respect and self-esteem. If, however, this is so, then underpinning 
all explicit commitment to the concrete norms and values of one’s epoch, culture, 
peer group, etc., there is implicit commitment to a principle of fairness and 
equity. With this, we have reached the thick conception of the finitely rational 
agent.
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